The Tripartite Pact was the
diplomatic alliance between the
Axis Powers: Germany,
Italy,
and Japan.
Japan's involvement with
the Axis went back to November 25, 1936, when Japan signed a
short
note with Germany agreeing to cooperate against Communist Russia.
Italy
joined this Anti-Comintern Pact on November 6, 1937.
Germany had extended considerable military aid to China during the 1930s, which included
arms and military advisors. Considering themselves the friends of both
Japan and China, the Germans declared their neutrality in the
Sino-Japanese conflict and attempted without success to mediate a
settlement. The Japanese in turn pressured Berlin to remove its
advisors from China and cancel its arms contracts. Chiang did everything
possible to cultivate German friendship, including endorsing the German
Anschluss with Austria, but in
the end Japan proved too valuable an ally for Germany and, in April
1938, Hitler ceased all military aid to China.
Debate raged in Tokyo throughout
1939 over the terms of a formal alliance to be negotiated with Germany.
The Army minister, Itagaki
Seishiro, wanted a comprehensive alliance that would automatically
go into effect. The Navy minister, Yonai Mitsumasa, wanted the
scope of the alliance restricted to Russia and invoked at the
discretion of the signatories. The ambassadors to Germany and Italy,
Oshima and Shiratori, were in the ultranationalist camp and sometimes
exceeded their instructions in an effort to push through a
comprehensive alliance. The Cabinet deadlocked after a compromise
proposal communicated to Germany and Italy on 3 May 1939 was ignored
by both Hitler and Mussolini.
Relations between Japan and Germany suffered a severe blow when
Germany
signed a non-aggression pact with Russia in August 1939. However, the
destroyers-for-bases deal
between the United States
and Britain on 2 September
1940 renewed interest in Germany for a military alliance with Japan.
The Japanese Navy demurred, still fearing the likely outcome of a war
with the United States, but a compromise was negotiated that left Japan
with enough freedom of action to win the support of the Navy.
The Tripartite Pact itself was signed on September 27, 1940. This pact recognized the German-Italian “new order” in Europe and the Japanese “new order” in greater East Asia. The three nations pledged themselves to make war on each other’s behalf against any intervening “power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict”, a clear reference to the United States, since the Pact specifically excluded Russia. Unsurprisingly, Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact became a major point of contention with the United States leading to the Pacific War.
It seems clear that both Japan and Germany hoped the Tripartite Pact
would act as a deterrent to the United States. However, Japan had
occupied northern French
Indochina just a few days before the pact was signed, and this
combination of events was viewed in the United States as a provocation,
producing the opposite effect from what was likely intended.
On 13 April 1941 Japan signed a non-aggression pact with Russia, which cleared the way for a move against Southeast Asia. Less than three months later, Germany launched its massive invasion of Russia, on 21 June 1941. Once again Japan found its policy towards Russia at odds with the actions of its principal ally. Japan chose to honor the nonaggression pact throughout the Pacific War, until it was renounced by Russia in August 1945.
Unlike
the United
Nations, the
Tripartite Pact never became an effective alliance.
Though there was considerable cooperation between Italy and Germany in
Europe,
Japan
was too distant for effective military cooperation with the other two
nations. A few
German and Italian submarines operated
from Japanese bases
in Malaya
and there
was some exchange of technology and strategic raw materials, but the
difficulty
of running the Allied blockade, even with submarines, prevented this
exchange
from achieving decisive results. It also seems likely that
the Axis never
really trusted each other, and their policy towards Russia was
completely uncoordinated in spite of the obvious value of coordinated
policy towards the central Eurasian power.
Racism likely played a role. While Italian fascism was not
notably racist, both German and Japanese fascism were deeply racist.
Although Himmler convinced himself that the Japanese had "Aryan" blood,
he could not convince Hitler, who received Oshima twice shortly after
Pearl Harbor but then not
again for over a year. A Japanese proposal to
attack Madagascar in 1942 was strongly opposed by the Germans as an
infringement on the German sphere of operations (the dividing line was
at 70 degrees east longitude.)
Some idea of how artificial the alliance was can be gleaned
from a communication on 26 July 1941 from the Thai prime minister to the
American
minister (Prange 1988):
The primer minister of Thailand advised the American minister that the German military attaché had warned him against "going too far" with Japan because "you cannot trust Japan." The attaché added ominously that Germany would "settle with Japan after she has won the war in Europe."
Curiously, Thailand did not sign the Tripartite Pact even after she
was pressured into entering an alliance with Japan and declaring war on
Britain and the United States.
Text of the
Tripartite Pact (Yale Avalon Project; accessed 2008-9-6)
References
Hastings
(2007)
Hsiung and Levine
(1992)
The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia © 2007-2010 by Kent G. Budge. Index
