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National Archives #80-G-453313
Battleships were the most heavily armed and
armored warships
in a navy. At the start of the Pacific War, the most powerful
were typically
armed
with, and armored against, 16”
(406mm) guns, and
were capable of
speeds in
excess of 20
knots. The United States
later launched
battleships capable of 33 knots. The Japanese
built super battleships
with
18” (460 mm) guns
and up
to
27” (650mm) of armor that were capable of 27 knots speed.
All were designed for a Jutland-style long-range gunnery duel
against their counterparts from the enemy fleet.
Prior to the Pacific War, these colossally
expensive ships were widely
considered
the ultimate arbiters of naval power. Their construction required
a
major investment of national resources and years of design and
construction. British planners in 1936 formally estimated that the
cost of building,maintaining, and operating a battleship was
equivalent to the similar cost for a fleet of 43 medium bombers. This
made them an obvious target for arms
control
efforts between the wars. The Washington Naval
Treaty
limited both the design
and numbers of battleships of the major powers, with the United
States
and Britain limited to
15
battleships and Japan to 10. This disparity in numbers created
considerable resentment
in
Japan. All powers were limited to battleships of not more than
35,000 tons displacement with guns limited to 16" caliber, and a
ten-year "building holiday" went into effect during which new
battleships were not to be constructed to replace older ones.
The Second London Conference of 1936 sought to
restrict new battleships
to 14" (356mm) guns with a 25,000 ton displacement. American
resistance
to the
low displacement resulted in a treaty agreement of 14" guns and
35,000
ton displacement. Since Japan had announced as early as March
1934 that she
intended to withdraw from the treaty regime, escalator clauses
were
included
to allow increase in gun size to 16" and an increase in
displacement
to 45,000 tons. In 1937 the escalator clause for gun size was
invoked
and in 1938 the escalator clause for tonnage was invoked.
Under the terms of the treaty, the British were allowed to
construct
two
battleships, the Nelson and Rodney, to build up to
the
allowed
tonnages. The ships carried 16" guns and were unusual in having
all
three of their turrets mounted forward. These ships were built
before
the 1936 treaty limited gun size to 14". The next battleships
built
for the British Navy were the King George V class
with 14"
guns and
35,000 ton displacement. Once the escalator clauses were invoked,
the
British built Vanguard
with
15" guns and 45,000 ton displacement. However, Vanguard was not completed by
the
time of the surrender.
After the
war started and the treaties became moot, the British planned for
a larger and more powerful Lion
class, but the two units laid down were never completed.
The Americans were already built up to treaty limits, and
did not build any new ships until the "building holiday" ended.
The
first new class, the North Carolina, was
designed to
accept either
quadruple 14" turrets or triple 16" turrets. So while the ship
was
designed with 14" guns and armor to withstand 14" shells, once the
escalator clause for gun size was invoked, the ships were actually
built with 16" guns. The next class, the South
Dakota, was built with armor to resist 16"
shellfire, but
due to the 35,000 ton displacement was very cramped. The
Iowa
class was designed after the tonnage escalator clause was invoked
and had 16" guns on 45,000 tons displacement. Once the war
started, the
Montana was designed with
a
higher displacement, but was never laid down.
The Japanese, who led the way in leaving the treaty
structure, ended up completing the smallest number of modern
battleships. The two Yamato
class battleships were completed early in
the war, with the third
unit converted to a carrier while still
under construction.
Battleship designs of a given displacement must strike a balance between protection, speed, and firepower. One rule of thumb is that a battleship should have sufficient armor to protect its vitals against shells of the same caliber as its own guns at likely engagement distances. Battleships of the Second World War also needed to devote some of their displacement to underwater protection against mines and torpedoes, to a powerful antiaircraft battery, and to deck armor capable of protecting their vitals against bombs of up to 2000 lbs (900 kg) weight dropped from several thousand feet. Battleships were also expected to be faster than ever, with speed sufficient to escort fast carriers. Their heavy guns and armor meant that battleships, more than any other type of warship, had to be designed within a strict weight budget for a given displacement.
As Friedman (1985) has pointed out, the old and new American battleships fought very different wars. The new battleships, with their higher speed, spent much of the war serving as escorts for carrier forces. Occasionally they were detached for surface action, as at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (where Washington destroyed Kirishima), but this was the exception. The older battleships, which were too slow to make effective carrier escorts, found themselves serving as a fleet-in-being on the West Coast early in the war, and as fire support ships for amphibious operations later on. However, they, too, experienced surface action, at Surigao Strait. Ironically, the use of the older battleships as fire support ships, which tied them to the beachheads, made them prime targets for air attack. As a result, the older battleships suffered significantly more battle damage than the new battleships.
Viewed as the mainstay of the fleet when war broke out, the battleship was widely considered a dinosaur without a future by the time the war ended. The truth lay somewhere in between. Battleships did not have the reach of aircraft carriers, the new queens of the fleet, but they were much harder to destroy than the carriers, and the newer battleships carried an impressive antiaircraft battery with which to protect the carrier task forces. Battleships also remained useful for night operations and for shore bombardment during amphibious assaults. No carrier stood a chance against a battleship in a surface engagement; but battleship guns had a range of just 20 to 30 miles (30 to 50 km), while carrier aircraft could strike at distances of two to three hundred miles (300 to 500 km).
Hiroshima saw to it that no new battleships would be completed postwar. No conceivable armor protection could stand up to a nuclear-tipped projectile, and so the only viable capital ships were carriers, whose air wings had at least a fighting chance of keeping a nuclear-armed opponent out of range. Even if nuclear weapons had not entered into the picture, the advent of heavy guided bombs that could hit a warship from very high altitude rendered conventional horizontal protection obsolete. However, the remaining U.S. battleships were repeatedly brought out of mothballs to serve as fire support ships in limited wars, and they were still seeing combat service as late as 1990. However, it is now the view of the Navy that they are no longer cost effective, and none are currently in commission.
References
Brown (2000)
Dullin and
Garzke
(1976)
Friedman (1978,
1985)
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