Surrender

Surrender can refer either to the surrender of individual soldiers or small groups of soldiers, the surrender of a larger military formation by its commander, or the surrender of an entire nation.

The Allied and Japanese attitudes towards surrender were very different. The Allied attitude was based on the Roman doctrine of just war that was inherited by the Christian West. Under this doctrine, the purpose of a just war was not to physically annihilate the enemy, but to impose one's will on him. Unnecessary killing and destruction was to be avoided. Thus, surrender was generally regarded as honorable when further resistance was pointless. Mass Allied surrenders were common in the first six months of the war, when the Japanese Centrifugal Offensive swept aside all opposition. Thereafter Allied troops became very reluctant to surrender, both because of the fear of atrocities and because the strategic setting had become such that Allied troops were less likely to find themselves in hopeless tactical situations.

To the Japanese Army of the Pacific War, operating under a twisted version of the ancient Bushido code, surrender was unthinkable. The most honorable fate for a warrior was to die while taking many enemies with him (as with the kamikazes.) Ordinary death in battle was the next most honorable fate, while suicide was the preferred alternative to surrender.  Very few Japanese officers were captured alive until the final months of the war, and not many then. Surrenders by enlisted men were more common but still infrequent. Japanese troops who found themselves in a hopeless tactical situation would usually either stage a suicidal charge (the so-called banzai charge) or simply take up defensive positions and defend these to the death. The latter became the preferred option in the last months of the war.

Under traditional bushido, captives were to be treated with mercy. This injunction failed to make it into the code of the modern Japanese Army. Allied prisoners of war were regarded by the Japanese as completely dishonorable and were subject to appalling treatment. It did not help that discipline within the Japanese Army itself was brutal, and many of the prison camp guards were Korean conscripts who were at the bottom of the military pecking order. The Korean guards were mistreated by their Japanese NCOs, and mistreated Allied prisoners in turn.

Japanese prisoners of war were usually treated humanely, in part because Allied intelligence officers considered prisoners to be valuable intelligence assets. The Japanese did nothing to prepare their men for the possibility of capture, since that possibility was unthinkable, and Japanese prisoners tended to talk freely with their captors. Many Japanese prisoners begged their captors to allow them to remain in Allied countries and to not inform their government of their capture rather than face the dishonor of returning alive to their families. These requests were refused, since such notification was required under the laws of war.

Individual or Small Group Surrender


Photograph of Japanese soldiers surrendering

Army Signal Corps #SC 204800

Surrender by individuals or small groups was not nearly as common in the Pacific as in the European theater. Japanese enlisted men would occasionally surrender in small numbers once they were cut off and their officers killed. This became increasingly common as the war progressed. Individual Allied troops surrendered in some numbers early in the war, but this became less common as fear of mistreatment became widespread. In either case, surrender was signaled by waving a white flag or raising one's empty hands above one's head.

There were numerous allegations that Japanese troops feigned surrender in order to kill the Allied troops attempting to receive their surrender, often with a concealed grenade or (in small groups) by concealing a machine gunner behind the front ranks of "surrendering" troops. Japanese sailors rescued at sea sometimes turned on their rescuers, as when a survivor from sunken destroyer Yugumo killed the American sailor from PT-163 who offered him a cup of coffee. As a result, many Allied soldiers became averse to giving Japanese the opportunity to surrender, in violation of the Geneva conventions forbidding a  "no quarter" policy.

Morison gives an example of the extremes to which Japanese sailors would go to avoid capture:

On their way north, the bluejackets topside in destroyer Spence were goggle-eyed at an exhibition of Japanese bushido. Ordered to investigate a life raft, they observed what appeared to be seven bodies in it. The seven bodies suddenly sat up and started talking. One of them, apparently the officer, broke out a 7.7mm machine gun, which each man in succession placed in his mouth, while the officer fired a round which shot the back of the man's head off. After six had been bumped off, the officer stood up, addressed a short speech in Japanees to Spence's commanding officer on the bridge, and then shot himself.

The Japanese occasionally tried to induce individual surrender by Allied troops by dropping "surrender cards" promising proper treatment if the soldier followed the surrender instructions printed on the card. These cards often featured a pornographic photograph of a Western woman on the reverse side to entice the Allied soldiers. The cards proved ineffective for their intended purpose.

Large Unit Surrender

A military officer may surrender his command to the enemy when his situation becomes hopeless. In theory, such surrenders can be conditional or unconditional, though few large unit surrenders during the Second World War were received on any conditions beyond basic adherence to the laws of war. Subordinates of a commander who surrenders may attempt escape (like any prisoner of war) but, if they engage in military activities after their commander surrenders, and before they are able to rejoin their chain of command, they are considered unlawful combatants and are not protected as prisoners of war. The Japanese routinely executed American troops who became guerrillas in the Philippines following Wainright's surrender, and the Allies threatened to execute Japanese troops who refused to turn themselves in after the general surrender in August 1945.

There were no surrenders of large Japanese units until after the general surrender of August 1945. Surrender of large Allied units was common during the first months of the war, with units of brigade size or larger surrendered by their commanders in Hong Kong, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java. In every case, the surrender was unconditional, which the Japanese chose to interpret as meaning that even the laws of war did not apply.

At the time Wainright surrendered Corregidor, there was some ambiguity regarding the American chain of command. MacArthur believed himself to still be the commander of all American troops in the Philippines, in spite of the fact that he was then in Australia. If MacArthur was correct, then Wainright had authority only over the troops on Corregidor. However, the Japanese insisted that radio instructions from Washington to Corregidor proved that Wainright was the commander of all American troops in the Philippines. Thus Homma had some legal basis for his threat to execute any Americans in the Philippines who did not turn themselves in after Wainright surrendered. On the other hand, the reluctance of other Philippines commanders to surrender suggests that they did not understand themselves to be under Wainright's command. They did not surrender until Homma threatened to massacre the Corregidor garrison, an action that would have violated the laws of war regardless of the command situation.

Japan's Final Surrender

Japan announced its surrender as a nation on 15 August 1945, and a cease-fire went into effect shortly thereafter, although the surrender ceremony that formally ended hostilities did not take place until 2 September 1945. The remaining Japanese armed forces in the field surrendered as soon thereafter as arrangements could be made.

The decision to surrender followed three events that made it clear to all but the most diehard Japanese militarists that the war was lost. The first was the destruction of the Japanese merchant marine, which made it impossible for Japan to import enough food to feed its civilian population, let alone maintain military production. This process was essentially complete by mid-1945. The second event was the dropping of nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945. The third was the declaration of war by Russia on 9 August, followed by a swift and crushing invasion of Manchuria.

Historians have long debated the importance of these three elements in forcing the surrender, with those philosophically opposed to the nuclear bombings tending to discount their importance relative to the other two elements. However, there are indications that the nuclear attacks made a profound impression on the Emperor, who broke precedent by acting to resolve the deadlock in the Japanese Cabinet in favor of accepting the Allied surrender terms.

These terms were spelled out in the Potsdam Declaration, and amounted to something just short of an unconditional surrender. The Allies insisted on the occupation and complete demilitarization of Japan, but offered vague guarantees not to deindustrialize Japan and to restore Japanese sovereignty at an unspecified future date. The Japanese made some attempts to negotiate less severe terms through intermediaries (including the Russians, prior to their declaration of war) but, except for hints that the Allies were prepared to retain the Emperor as a figurehead, these were rejected. Continued anxiety over the postwar status of the Emperor contributed to continuing resistance to surrender, with the Army Minister, Anami Korechika, leading the diehards. When the Allies began dropping leaflets with the text of the Potsdam Declaration on Japan, political pressure to bring the war to an end increased. Whether the war could have been ended sooner by offering clearer guarantees regarding the Emperor, without the need for the nuclear attacks, remains a contentious issue among historians. It is the belief of this author that the decision to surrender was a very close thing even with the nuclear attacks.

References

Morison (1950)

Prados (1995)