Aircraft Pilots

National Archives #80-G-373673

Aircraft proved to be a decisive weapon during the Pacific War. However, no weapon can be better than the men who use it. The Japanese had a clear edge in pilot skill when war broke out, but the Pacific War was characterized by a steady improvement in Allied aircraft pilot skills and a steady degradation in Japanese pilot skill.

Japanese pilots

The Japanese Navy began the war with superbly trained pilots. None of the Japanese pilots involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor had logged less than 600 hours of flying time, and many flight leaders had over 1500 hours’ experience. Flying the excellent Zero, Japanese fighter pilots were able to sweep opposing aircraft out of the skies of the southwest Pacific in the early months of the war.

Japanese naval pilot training emphasized quality over quantity. Selection criteria were so strict that no more than 100 pilot candidates were accepted in some years. The training course took more than two years and was brutally demanding. Emphasis was placed on aerial maneuvers appropriate for dogfights, such as the characteristic hineri-komi or “turning-in” maneuver that many Allied pilots described as a “falling-leaf” maneuver. Navy fighter pilots were trained to work in the three-plane shotai, and this training continued after assignment to operational units, so that the pilots in a shotai developed a sixth sense for each other’s reactions. This helped compensate for the very poor radio equipment in most Japanese aircraft.  (The radios were apparently spoiled by unshielded ignition systems.)

Japanese Army pilot training was somewhat less demanding than that of the Navy. The complete training course took two years and pilots graduated with 300 hours' flying time. Basic flight training was conducted in the Ki-17 "Cedar" biplane trainer and continued in the Ki-9 "Spruce" intermediate trainer. Final operational training took place in the Ki-55 "Ida". Pilots were then assigned to a flying training unit for six months, followed by assignment to a fighter squadron, where they received a final three months' training before entering combat. The Japanese Army started the war with inferior aircraft such as the Nate and took heavy casualties over Burma and China even in the early days of the war. However, the Army shared the Navy’s emphasis on dogfighting and had similar personnel policies.

The majority of Japanese pilots were noncommissioned officers. This was in marked contrast with the U.S. Army and Navy, where most pilots were commissioned. Japanese noncommissioned officers drawn from fleet service were trained by the Pilot Trainee System (Sōjū Renshūsei, or Sōren), while young men aged 15 to 17 drawn directly from civilian life were trained by the Flight Reserve Enlisted Trainee System (Hikō Yoka Renshūsei, or Yokaren).  Only a small number of college students were recruited into the Student Aviation Reserve (Kōkū Yobi Gakusei) to become reserve ensigns, although this program expanded rapidly after war broke out, training over 10,000 pilots in 1943. A dark side of the Japanese system was the great social gulf between officers and enlisted men. Even such superb noncommissioned pilots as Sakai Saburo, Japan’s second leading ace to survive the war, were frequently mistreated by their officers. Corporal punishment was an integral part of training.

Because Japanese culture discouraged emphasis on the individual, Japanese aces were not given the same attention as Allied aces. However, especially productive pilots would be rewarded with a promotion, which amounted to a nice pay raise for the enlisted pilots. Officer pilots ran the risk of being promoted out of command of flying units.

There was no system of regular rotation of pilots. Japanese pilots usually flew until they died or were crippled. Sakai survived the war because he was half-blinded over Guadalcanal: He mistook a flight of Avengers for a flight of Wildcats and approached incautiously from the rear, making himself an easy target for the Avengers’ rear gunners. Wounded in the head, he somehow made it back to Rabaul, but lost his sight in one eye, was sent back to Japan, and did not again participate in combat missions until the last, desperate days of the war.

The Japanese system was suitable for a nation that hoped to win quick, limited wars. When the Japanese attacked in the Pacific, they held nothing back. There was no reserve of skilled pilots to speak of. Indeed, Peattie (2001) has pointed out that, when war broke out, 11 Air Fleet had been drawn on so heavily for cadre for the new Shokakus that its rosters already included significant numbers of incompletely trained pilots. As attrition set in, particularly during the Guadalcanal campaign, the training system proved entirely inadequate to replace losses. Though Japanese pilots continued to show superb combat skill through the end of 1942, by mid-1943 Allied pilots began to notice a sharp decline in their opponent’s flying skills. By 1944, Japan's supply of skilled pilots was so limited that many flight instructors were reassigned from training units to Ozawa's Mobile Force at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in an all-or-nothing effort to stop the American counteroffensive. The outcome was the slaughter of the Japanese pilots in what the Americans dubbed "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot."

When war broke out, the average Japanese Navy pilot had 700 hours' flying time while Army pilots averaged 500 hours' flying time. This had dropped to 275 hours in the Navy and 130 in the Army by 1 January 1945,  reflecting a precipitous decline in the level of training of replacement pilots. By late 1944, a new Japanese Navy pilot graduated with just 40 hours flying time, while his American opponent had at least 525 hours flying time. Relative losses in combat were correspondingly disproportionate: The U.S. Navy lost just two dive bombers and five torpedo planes in aerial combat in the last eight months of the war. The Japanese Army was likewise forced to reduce pilot training to 60 or 70 hours' flight time by 1945, while the U.S. Army held firmly to its requirement of at least 200 hours' flight time to the end of the war.

American pilots

During the 1920s, the U.S. Navy trained its pilots almost as thoroughly as the Japanese Navy. Pilot candidates had to be college graduates who met strict physical standards. All received commissions. Flight training took two years and emphasis was placed on deflection shooting and cooperative tactics. However, in the years just before the war, the Navy shifted its emphasis towards producing larger numbers of good pilots rather than small numbers of superb pilots. The flight time requirement dropped to just 305 hours. As a result, when war broke out, 75% of U.S. Navy carrier pilots had fewer flight hours than the least qualified Japanese Navy carrier pilot.

However, the Americans were able to vastly expand their training program, in part because they had a much larger pool of qualified pilot candidates to draw on. It was estimated that 500,000 men in the U.S. had the necessary aptitude to become pilots, although arbitrary eligibility requirements cut this figure to a total of 193,400 pilots trained during the war. These included 35,000 U.S. Army fighter pilots. By contrast, the Japanese graduated just 46,000 pilots. The Americans also had a policy of rotating experienced pilots out of combat units into training units before combat fatigue made them careless. There were experiments with training noncommissioned pilots, but eventually the experiment was abandoned and most of the pilots involved received their commissions.

With seizable numbers of reserve pilots and a large training program, and with the new Essex carriers not due to start joining the fleet until late 1943, the American Navy actually increased its training requirements. The pilots who manned the new carriers all had a minimum of two year’s training and 500 hours’ flight time. Replacement Air Groups (RAGs) were established from 1 April 1944 to put the final polish on pilots. Eventually four RAGs were established: two in the Pacific and one each on the East and West Coasts.

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Army gave its fighter pilots solid aviation training, but almost none in gunnery. Pilots arriving at Wheeler Field had 200 to 300 hours flight time, but some had never fired a weapon. Because the Army required large numbers of pilots for the European theater, it never attempted as thorough of training as the Navy. Quantity had to be emphasized over quality throughout the war, and an Army Air Force pilot won his wings in just 9 months with about 200 hours' flight time. Basic training typically began with in the Stearman PT-17, a biplane trainer, and continued in the Vultee BT-13/15 monoplane trainer. Advanced training took place in the legendary T-6 Texan and was followed by assignment to an operational unit. However, in December 1942 the Army Air Force organized Fighter Replacement Training Units (FRTUs) where new fighter pilots polished their skills for two months. In some cases, training was much better: P-38 pilots were selected on the basis of highly competitive mock dogfights after 350 hour’s flight time. In other respects, Army policies resembled those of the Navy.

Tactics

Prior to the Second World War, air combat was centered on the dogfight, in which fighter aircraft attempted to outmaneuver each other and get on their opponent's tail to deliver a fatal burst of fire. Most Japanese fighters of the Second World War were optimized for dogfighting, and they were probably the most maneuverable monoplanes ever built. The Allied pilot who attempted to out turn his Japanese opponent in a dogfight rarely survived.

However, American air tacticians, such as Claire Chennault, came to the conclusion that hit and run tactics had superseded dogfighting. Allied pilots looked for opportunities to hit the enemy by surprise and from above, and if they failed to destroy their target, they simply kept going. If they were themselves surprised, they would head for the deck and perform a sharp turn to try to shake their pursuers. Maneuverability became the least important performance category for most American fighter aircraft designers, who chose to optimize speed, protection, and firepower instead.

In addition, Jimmy Thatch pioneered cooperative tactics such as the scissors or Thatch Weave. A pair of Allied fighters would fly a few hundred yards apart and keep an eye on each other's tails. If one of the fighters was jumped by an enemy fighter, his wingman would immediately turn sharply towards him, which warned him that he was under attack. He would then turn sharply towards his wingman, forcing his pursuer to either break off or be vulnerable to attack by his wingman. These tactics were so effective that a saying began to go around: A lone Wildcat against a lone Zero was outnumbered ten to one, but two Wildcats against ten Zeros outnumbered their opponents ten to one.

The effects of the uneven battle of attrition became evident as early as mid-1943. On 25 April 1943, a group of just four Corsairs defending Henderson Field engaged a group of 16 "Bettys" and 20 "Zeros" and shot down five aircraft at the cost of two of their own. On 5 June 1943 a sweep by 81 "Zeros" opposed by 110 Allied fighters over the Russell Islands cost the Japanese 25 aircraft versus seven for the Allies. A sweep on 12 June had a similar outcome. Such lopsided outcomes would have been unthinkable a year earlier.

Aces

The Allies gave much more publicity to aces (pilots who destroyed five or more enemy aircraft) than the Japanese did. An ace was almost certain to be decorated for his accomplishment, and particularly outstanding performance could win an American pilot the Medal of Honor. On the other hand, the brass saw no need to promote an ace unless he also displayed superb leadership qualities. Many aces, such as Jimmy Thatch and Joe Foss, had such qualities and would achieve high rank. Others did not.

Top Imperial Japanese Navy Aces

Top Allied Aces of the Pacific War

As these tables show, the top Japanese aces claimed many more kills than their American counterparts. There are a couple of explanations for this. Many of the Japanese aces were credited with a large number of kills over China against inferior pilots and aircraft. American claims required confirmation from gun cameras or a second pilot, and postwar analyses of Japanese loss records tend to support their claims. Japanese claims were not nearly so well verified and may be badly exaggerated.

References

Bergerud (2000)

Dunnigan and Nofi (1998)
Frank (1999)

Hastings (2007)
Molesworth (2008)

Morison (1950)
Peattie (2001)

Prange (1981)

Tillman (1997, 2005)

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia © 2006, 2008-2010 by Kent G. Budge. Index

Visit our discussion forums.

Comment on this article