Burma

Burma was a relatively recent addition to the British Empire in 1941, having come under British control as recently as 1840. It has an ethnically diverse population, and different ethnic groups chose different sides when the Japanese invaded in January 1942. The ethnic Burmese leaned towards the Japanese, who promised independence, until the Japanese promises began to ring hollow late in the war. The Shan tribes of eastern Burma were strongly pro-Japanese, while the hill tribes to the north (such as the Kachins) were strongly pro-British, at least in part due to Japanese atrocities. The total population in 1941 was about 18 million, and of these, about a million were Indians who dominated the commercial and civil service sectors. These would suffer terribly as a result of the British retreat from Burma, which in turn would be a significant factor in the ending of the Raj (British rule over India.)

Burma has an area of 262,000 square miles (679,000 square kilometers), making it larger than any single country in Europe, and it extends over twenty degrees of latitude. The geography is dominated by the Irrawady River valley, which is a low plain in the center of the country. Most of the population is located along the river. The remainder of Burma is rugged, jungle-clad hills subject to extremes in climate due to the shifting monsoon. During the winter, the country is hot, dry, and dusty; in the summer, it becomes a sweltering sea of mud.

Burma also includes the Tenasserim, the strip of coastline along the west side of the Kra Isthmus. This region had a series of airfields that were part of the air bridge between India and Malaya. The Tenasserim also included useful ports at Tavoy and Moulmein.

The Irrawady valley contains significant oil fields such as those at Yenangyaung. There is also considerably mineral wealth in the form of tin and tungsten mines in the mountains running along the eastern boundaries of the country and down to the Kra Isthmus. Though the Japanese coveted these mineral resources, their primary objective in invading Burma was strategic. The country would form the westernmost anchor of their defense perimeter and serve as a possible staging area for an invasion of India. This was actually attempted in 1944, but turned into a catastrophic defeat for the Japanese, in part because of the exceedingly poor communications across the mountains that divide Burma from India.

Another motivation for the Japanese to invade Burma was to cut the Burma Road through which China received its Lend-Lease aid. The Allies expended considerable resources to restore the land route to China by taking northern Burma and running a new road from Ledo in India through the jungles to China. This road was completed in 1945, by which time it had become largely irrelevant to the outcome of the war.

The First Burma Campaign

Following Thailand's conversion to a Japanese puppet within days of Pearl Harbor, it became clear that Burma would soon be subject to Japanese invasion. On 16 December 1941 Chiang ordered a Chinese Expeditionary Army organized in Yennan, and assigned it 5, 6, and 66 Armies, a total of about 100,000 troops, from Szechwan and Kwangsi. These were the last fully trained units from China's strategic reserve. The British distrusted Chiang and asked the Chinese to remain outside British territory on 24 December 1941. The British did not reconsider until Burma was invaded in late January 1942.

Japanese aircraft began bombing Rangoon on 23 December 1941, but with heavy commitments elsewhere, Japanese troops did not enter Burma until 15 January 1942. On that date 55 Division crossed into Burma north of Mergui while 33 Division advanced into Burma along a series of trails further inland. Hutton ordered Smyth to hold Moulmein with 17 Indian Division in spite of its tenuous communications to Rangoon: There was only a single bridge across the Sittang and Bilin rivers and no bridge at all across the Salween, which left Moulmein reliant on ferries from Martaban. This was a hopeless task, and Moulmein fell on 31 January, though not before the garrison put up a stiff fight.

During this period, Hutton took the precaution of moving most of the military stores at Rangoon north to Mandalay. This would have enormous repercussions later in the campaign.

Japanese troops crossed the Salween on 10 February and advanced rapidly. Smyth had put together a realistic and intelligent plan to hold on the Sittang, a formidable military obstacle, long enough to be joined by 48 Indian Brigade and 7 Armored Brigade. The land west of the Sittang was flat and cultivated and would have been good tank country for 7 Armored to operate in. However, Wavell, who consistently underestimated the Japanese, ordered Smyth to hold east of the Bilin, which was little more than a shallow creek at this time of year. Smyth was outflanked by 214 Regiment and his forces were badly battered and forced back. The last bridge across the Sittang was demolished prematurely on 23 February 1942, leaving much of the 17 Indian Division on the wrong side. Most of the men escaped, but the heavy equipment was lost and the division was hors de combat, making a prolonged defense along the Sittang impossible.

On 5 March Hutton was relieved by Alexander and his orders to abandon Rangoon were countermanded by Wavell. However, Alexander quickly appreciated that holding Rangoon was impossible, and he ordered a retreat to the north. Meanwhile, Iida ignored demands from his own superiors that he move directly into central Burma, and his two divisions raced towards Rangoon, the capture of which would end Iida's reliance on tenuous land communications and allow reinforcements to be brought in more easily.

Alexander's reputation for luck was reaffirmed. Although Rangoon fell on 7 March 1942, the Japanese were so intent on turning Alexander's nonexistent west flank that they left open the route to the north. Alexander's armor was able to cover the breakout and and the Japanese found Rangoon a ghost town.

The Japanese continued to pursue the British up the Irrawady Valley. 55 Division was to advance up the Sittang Valley and crush the Allied forces against the 33 Division coming up the Irrawady Valley. In spite of support from Chinese forces in the Sittang Valley, the British were unable to hold a line south of Mandalay, which fell on 1 May 1942. 200 Chinese Division fought bravely at Toungoo, but the other divisions of 5 Army refused to come forward and 200 Division was annihilated in an 11-day action and failed to destroy the bridge across the Sittang. Of the 100,000 Chinese troops who marched into Burma in January, fewer than half survived.

The campaign came to an end as the British retreated into India via Imphal, with the first elements arriving on 15 May. Most of the surviving Chinese forces retreated into Yunnan, but a few units (including most of New 22 and New 38 Divisions) were forced to retreat with the British into India, where they would eventually become the core of  the training program at Ramgarh. With the Japanese at the end of their logistics and the British in no position to counterattack, the line stabilized along the hill country between Burma and India.

The defeat in Burma was a disaster for China. Chiang had committed his forces with reluctance, at the prodding of Stilwell, and at one told him (Hsiung and Levine 1992):

In our Burma operations we must win victory and cannot afford a defeat. Why? Once the cream of Chinese troops as represented by the Fifth and Sixth armies is defeated, it would be impossible to counterattack not only in Burma but also in the whole of China. And there would be no efficient reserves in Yunnan or the Yangtze valley. The consequence would be very grave for China. A defeat in Burma would not only have serious repercussions upon the moral of the Chinese troops but upon the morale of the Chinese nation. Although two of three armies are involved, their success or defeat would have grave effect upon the Chinese people.

Japanese order of battle, 15 January 1942:

Japanese Reinforcements

British order of battle, 15 January 1941:

British reinforcements

Kuomintang order of battle, 15 January 1942:

The First Arakan Campaign

The first British counteroffensive in Burma was an attempt to recapture the island of Akyab in late 1942. The airfield there would be useful both for protecting Calcutta and for projecting air power towards Rangoon, but the campaign was undertaken mostly as a demonstration that Britain was serious about fighting Japan. Accordingly, on 21 September 1942, 14 Indian Division under W.L. Lloyd began moving south from Chittagong. Resistance was initially light, the terrain proving a more formidable obstacle than the enemy. It took a month for the division to get within ten miles of Akyab, where it encountered heavy resistance in the form of log and earth bunkers manned by troops of 55 Division. The Indian troops were held up and then, in April, driven back by counterattacks across ridges the British had assumed were impassible. By May, 14 Division was back in Chittagong.

Following this debacle, the Indian Army began a program of comprehensive training in jungle warfare. This included the activation of two training divisions and the distribution of a pamphlet on jungle warfare that wags promptly dubbed The Jungle Book. At the same time, Slim and other commanders worked to improve their logistics by extending the rail and road network and to improve readiness by implementing effective malaria control measures. A new operational headquarters, Southeast Asia Command, was established under Mountbatten while GHQ India, now under Auchinleck, provided logistics and training.

The Myitkyina Campaign and Second Arakan Campaign

Library of Congress. Via Wikipedia Commons.

A more serious effort was made in 1944. The first objective was to retake the town of Myitkyina. The motivations were twofold: First, with the airfield in Allied hands, it would be possible for transport aircraft flying over "The Hump" to take a safer, more southerly route between India and China. Second, with north Burma cleared of the enemy, it would be possible to build a road between Ledo in India and Lashio in China, thereby reopening the Burma Road for supplies to China.

This offensive was conducted largely by three American-trained Chinese divisions operating out of Assam under the command of Stilwell. However, the offensive was spearheaded by a small American force, "Merrill's Marauders," which was modeled after the Chindits. Chiang was initially reluctant to participate in the campaign, but Stilwell played on Chiang's distrust of the British by suggesting that Lend-Lease supplies earmarked for China would be taken by the British if the Chinese did not participate in the campaign. The offensive got underway in January 1944.

Meanwhile Slim, now in command of the newly activated 14 Army,  made a second attempt to seize Akyab. In January 1944 the XV Indian_Corps  under A.F.P. Christison began advancing south through the Arakan. 5 Indian Division advanced on the west side of the Mayu Range while 7 Indian Division advanced on the east side of the range, and 81 West Africa Division operated further east to cover the flank of the advance. 5 and 7 Indian Divisions were expected to improve the road network as they advanced while 81 West Africa Division was to be supplied by air. In the event of a Japanese counterattack against their communications, 5 and 7 Indian Divisions were to form a perimeter defense (a "box") to repel the counterattack.

Kawabe Masakazu waited until he judged the British lines of communication were badly stretched before ordering 28 Army to launch its counterattack (Ha-Go). This came on 3 February 1944 when 55 Division (Hanaya) began a series of flanking attacks. One of its four columns found a gap between 7 Indian and 81 West Africa Division and punched through to the 7 Indian Division's main supply dump and division headquarters. The resulting Battle of the Admin Box saw the headquarters of 7 Indian Division almost destroyed and the division cut off from 5 Indian Division, but 7 Indian Division did not fall apart, and it was able to establish its defensive boxes. Warned in advance by the code breakers of the Japanese move, Slim prepared to resupply 7 Indian Division by air while 5 Indian Division and 26 Indian Division from the 14 Army reserve closed in to form the hammer that smashed the Japanese against the 7 Indian Division anvil. This strategy was successful, and 7 Indian Division was relieved on 24 February. By early March the British had returned to the offensive, and by June Hanaya was in retreat. The victory demonstrated that Indian troops could defeat the Japanese. Morale in the Indian Army soared. However, Akyab itself was not seized until 12 January 1945.

For the Japanese, Ha-Go was merely a preliminary operation aimed at pinning down Slim's reserves in the Arakan. The main Japanese attack would come further north.

U-Go

As the Allies advanced on Myitkyina and Akyab, the Japanese began their long-planned U-Go offensive. U-Go was the brain child of Mutaguchi Renya, who fired his own chief of staff for suggesting the plan could not succeed, then won over his superiors with an emotional plea for the operation. Eventually Tojo, who was intially skeptical, was won over by the prospect of a much-needed victory and the establishment of a puppet Indian government on Indian soil.

U-Go had the objective of seizing Imphal, Kohima, and Dimapur, isolating the Allied forces in northeast Assam and opening the road to India. Mutaguchi committed all of 15 Army, consisting of 15, 31, and 33 Divisions, to the attack. The main strength of 33 Division was to strike first, hooking around 17 Indian Division, destroying it, and then advancing on Imphal from the south. Other elements of 33 Division were to engage 20 Indian Division and destroy it as well. 31 Division was to attack a week later, seizing Kohima and advancing on Dimapur, while 15 Division was to cut the Kohima-Imphal road and then advance on Imphal from the north. 33 Division began its advance on 9 March 1944.

Slim was aware that the attack was coming, but underestimated its size based on their evaluation of the logistical difficulties of supplying a large attacking force. The Japanese, however, had adopted a "conquer or starve" strategy in which their troops were expected to resupply themselves from captured British depots. Hoyt (1993) has offered a biting commentary on the unreality of the Japanese plan:

Officers and men should carry maximum provisions.

(It was well known that men laden down with supplies could not fight properly.)

Elephants and oxen should be used for hauling stores and equipment.

(A great idea in the time of Genghis Khan, but not in the twentieth century.)

The oxen should be eaten when the provisions run out.

(So then who hauled the equipment?)

Personnel should be prepared to eat grass.

(They did.)

The advance along the road to Imphal from Kohima should be made in two weeks after the commencement of operations.

(Even a fully mechanized army could move only half that fast.)

The road should be repaired after its capture, in order to convey supplies at once by motor vehicle.

(Allied air attacks made the road worse and worse as each day went by.)

Slim planned to defend Imphal with the 17, 20, and 23 Indian Divisions. 17 and 20 Indian Divisions were deployed well forward of Imphal, but were ordered to pull back and dig in around the Imphal Plain once it was clear the Japanese offensive had begun. The three divisions would then live off the same depots that were the target of the Japanese attack.

When the Japanese attack began, 20 Indian Division began a skillful fighting withdrawal that inflicted serious losses on 33 Division. 17 Indian Division had a more difficult time extricating itself, but both divisions were able to pull back to the Imphal plain. Meanwhile 50 Indian Parachute Brigade was fighting desperately to hold the Japanese back from Kohima and from the northeastern approaches to Imphal. By now the magnitude of the Japanese offensive was becoming clear, and on 13 March Slim appealed to the highest command levels for the use of transport aircraft to fly in reinforcements. This was granted, and 5 Indian Division, fresh from repelling the Japanese counterattack in the Arakan, began to be flown in, with 161 Brigade arriving at Kohima by 20 March. The Japanese bid to pin down Slim's reserves with Ha-Go had failed.

As the Japanese offensive developed, the Chindits became active to the rear of the Japanese forces facing Stilwell's combined Chinese and American forces. This would prove only a modest distraction to the Japanese, though much was claimed for it at the time.

On 27 March Slim was reinforced with XXXIII Corps headquarters at Dimapur. XXXIII Corps was assigned 2 Division, which was joined by 7 Indian Division from the Arakan. At the same time, the remaining two brigades of 5 Indian Division were flown in to Imphal. On 2 April the Japanese cut the road between Kohima and Imphal, and Slim's plan to resupply Imphal by air was no longer optional. The  Japanese lay siege to Kohima, and the garrison was not relieved until 18 April by 5 Brigade coming up from Dimapur.

The siege of Imphal dragged on until 22 June, when 2 and 5 Indian Divisions finally linked up along the Kohima road. The Japanese forces were now in very serious trouble, having failed to take the British depots and having little or no logistical support of their own. On 9 July Mutaguchi finally acknowledge the offensive had failed and ordered a retreat. By then the Japanese formations were already losing cohesion. Slim kept the pressure up with 5 Indian and 11 East Africa Divisions, and the Japanese retreat turned into a rout in which thousands of Japanese soldiers perished from hunger and disease.

1944 was disastrous for the Japanese Army in Burma. The Japanese suffered 53,000 casualties out of a force of 85,000 men, of whom at least 30,000 died, along with 17,000 pack animals. Five divisions were destroyed and two more badly mauled. Allied casualties were 17,000 men. Kawabe and Mutaguchi were both relieved of their respective commands in August 1944.

Myitkyina Recaptured

The weather in 1944 suggested that the monsoon season would arrive early, shutting down military operations with its heavy rains. Stilwell therefore pressed his offensive against Myitkyina, sending the Marauders through mountainous jungle terrain to outflank the Japanese. On 16 May 1944 the Marauders seized the airfield against light resistance and transports began to roll in almost at once with fresh supplies. At the same time, the Chinese forces in Yunnan began moving into Burma to link up with the Assam force. Unfortunately the first transports into Myitkyina carried antiaircraft guns rather than troops, and by the time more infantry arrived, the Japanese had rushed their own troops into the town. The town was not cleared by Stilwell's Chinese troops until 3 August 1944, and the Yunnan and Assam forces did not clear the Ledo Road until 27 January 1945.

This victory came at a steep price to China. Casualties were 65,000 in Yunnan Force alone, and the forces involved, some of the best-trained and best-equipped left to the Chinese, were unavailable to repel the Ichi-go offensive.

Kuomintang order of battle, January 1944:

British order of battle, January 1944:

Japanese order of battle, January 1944:

EXTENDED CAPITAL: The Final Japanese Collapse

With Stilwell's Chinese divisions in firm control of northern Burma and the British in the Arakan, the collapse of the U-Go offensive sealed the fate of the Japanese Army in Burma. Slim had established two bridgeheads across the Chindwin by November 1944 and was determined to destroy Burma Area Army and recapture Rangoon before the moonsoon struck. He also knew that the supply line into Burma from Imphal would be overtaxed even with recent improvements to the roads, so that air resupply would be necessary. Anticipating that Kimura would stand and fight on the Shwebo Plain between the Chindwin and Irrawady, Slim crossed the  Chindwin in early December (Operation CAPITAL) and pursued the Japanese to the Irrawady with 19 and 20 Indian Divisions in the lead. Contrary to Slim's expectations, Kimura did not make a stand between the rivers, but left only a few rearguard units while pulling most of his forces across the Irrawady.

Slim was forced to reconsider his plans. The new strategy (EXTENDED CAPITAL) was a masterstroke of misdirection. Slim had XXXIII Corps, the main force on the plains, advance to the Irrawady and threaten Manadalay with crossings to the north and south. Meanwhile, XIV Corps, operating under radio silence, crossed the Irrawady much further south at Nyaunga. Once the Japanese reacted to the Mandalay crossings and committed their reserves, XIV Corps would launch a surprise attack across the Irrawady against Meiktila, threatening Kimura's communications and forcing him to attack XIV Corps. This would give Slim the opportunity to catch the Japanese between the hammer of XXXIII Corps and the anvil of XIV Corps.

19 Indian Division crossed the Irrawady north of Mandalay on 7-11 January 1945 and successfully beat off a series of counterattacks. As Kimura redeployed against this threat, on 14 February 1945, 20 Indian Division crossed the Irrawady just south of Mandalay. Two days later, 7 Indian Division launched its drive against Meiktila, and on 24 February 2 Division crossed the Irrawady even further south. Kimura had ignored intelligence warning of British activity to the south and now paid a heavy price for his neglect. Mandalay fell on 20 March 1945 after a hard fight at Fort Dufferin and Mandalay Hill. Meiktila had already fallen, on 3 March, and although 17 Indian Division and 255 Indian Tank Brigade were cut off and surrounded, they were resupplied from air and held their positions. Slim's hammer and anvil tactics then went into effect as the Japanese desperately attacked the isolated units in an attempt to clear their communications. Between 22-24 March contact was reestablished with the isolated forces and Burma Area Army, caught between the hammer and the anvil, was rapidly being destroyed.

Slim found himself in a race to reach Rangoon and end the Burma campaign before the monsoon arrived. This required his forces to race past any strong pockets of resistance and rely on resupply by air. This was a risky strategy, but it worked.  5 and 17 Indian Divisions leapfrogged down the Meiktila-Rangoon road while 7 and 20 Indian Divisions drove down the Irrawady valley. Although the monsoon hit when the British troops were still 50 miles north of Rangoon, at Pegu, a British amphibious force landed on 2 May to find the Japanese had evacuated the city. Though there was occasional heavy fighting throughout the rest of the summer as Japanese survivors tried to escape into Thailand, the Burma campaign was effectively over.

References

Costello (1981)

Drea (2009)

Dunlop (1979)

Generals.dk (accessed 2009-12-8)

Hastings (2007)

Hsiung and Levine (1992)

Marston (2005)

Slim (1956)

Willmott (1982)

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