Lend-Lease was the name of the program that began with Roosevelt's signature on House of Representatives Bill 1776 on March 11, 1941. This new law authorized the President to transfer defense materials to any country whose defense was considered vital to the security of the United States. The bulk of Lend-Lease aid went to Britain, but Russia also received substantial aid, and lesser amounts went to almost every other Allied power.
The debate over the bill was bitter, with isolationists claiming that the bill would draw the United States into a war that would bury every fourth American boy. Members of Congress objected to the power it would put in the President's hand. The CIO objected to a provision allowing the government to ban strikes in the factories producing Lend-Lease goods. Roosevelt responded to these objections in one of his "fireside chats" (radio broadcasts from the White House directly to the public), likening the proposal to lending a length of garden hose to a neighbor whose house was on fire. The bill passed by a single vote. With this bill, the United States became the great Arsenal of Democracy, proving weapons and matériel for itself and most of its allies.
An important feature of the bill was that defense materials were transferred without any obligation of debt on the recipient nations. This defused the issue of war debts before it could even be raised. However, there was a modest amount of "reverse Lend-Lease" in certain theaters. In the Pacific theater, Australia provided significant supplies and facilities to United States forces. This was not always appreciated, as when the Yanks grew to loathe mutton, but for the most part the assistance was very welcome. Reverse Lend-Lease did not, however, come close to repaying the cost of direct Lend-Lease.
Churchill said, "The Lease-Lend Bill must be regarded without question as the most unsordid act in the whole of recorded history." This was a bit generous. The original intent of Lend-Lease, as understood by Congress and the public, was to avoid shedding the blood of American soldiers by enabling others to fight more effectively. But Lend-Lease continued after the United States was forced into the war, and continued to be provided free of any obligation of indebtedness. Perhaps Churchill was right after all.
China received considerable
Lend-Lease assistance ($846 million), though this was still dwarfed by
that given to Commonwealth nations. Of this, some $820 million was in
the form of outright grants. This was in addition to $643 million in
credits outside the Lend-Lease program from 1938 onwards.
Lend-Lease aid to Russia was dismissed by Soviet historians of the Cold War era as insignificant, amounting to only 4% of the Soviet Union's own production. However, with the fall of Communism, Russian historians had greater access to historical archives and greater freedom to reach their own conclusions. Claims regarding Soviet productivity had been badly exaggerated, and a reevaluation shows that Lend-Lease amounted to a full 30% of the Soviet Union's own production. Most of this was raw materials, foodstuffs, POL, and machinery rather than arms (which constituted just 10% of the aid.) Lend-Lease supplied 57% of Russia's gasoline, 90% of Russia's rail stock, and enough food for an army of twelve million men for the duration of the war. Most of the trucks supplying the T-34 tanks and PPs-toting infantry that spearheaded Russia's counteroffensive against Germany were made in Detroit. It seems likely that Lend-Lease gave the Russians the margin for survival.
Nevertheless, the Russians so harassed Lend-Lease administrators and were so secretive about their resources that the American ambassador to Russia, Admiral William Standley, cabled Washington that (Smith 1985):
I am becoming convinced that we can only deal with [the Russians] on a bargaining basis, for our continuing to accede freely to their requests while agreeing to pay an additional price for every small request we make seems to arouse suspicion of our motives in the Oriental Russian mind rather than to build confidence.
Lend-Lease reached Russia through four routes, two of which were within the scope of the Pacific War. The Persian route ran through the western Indian Ocean and through Iran (Persia) into south Russia. It would have been susceptible to attack had the Japanese seized Madagascar or even Colombo, and did suffer some losses from far-ranging German and Japanese submarines.
The North Pacific route accounted for twice as much Lend-Lease tonnage as any other route. It consisted of two parts. The sea route extended from U.S. West Coast ports, such as Seattle, through Alaskan ports to Vladivostok. Ships on the western part of this route were under Soviet flag and were treated as neutral vessels by Japan, which was anxious not to disturb its non-aggression pact with Russia. The air bridge extended from Great Falls through Edmonton, Whitehorse, Galena, and Nome to Uel'en, Markovo, Iakutsk, Kiernsk, and Krasnoiarsk to Novosibirsk. Over 8000 aircraft flew this route during the latter part of the war. Aircraft were picked up at Nome by Russian pilots, were marked with Soviet colors, and were left unmolested by the Japanese on their flight to Siberia.
Project Hula was the
transfer of small ships and landing
craft to Russia from April to December 1945. About 250 ships and
boats were transferred with the intent of giving the Russians the
capability to conduct amphibious
operations against Japan. Russian sailors manned the ships at Cold Bay and received some training before taking them to Vladivostok. The project had
unintended consequences in that the Russians proceeded with the
invasion of the Kuriles
even after
the Japanese accepted the Potsdam
Declaration.
References
The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia © 2007, 2010 by Kent G. Budge. Index