Stilwell, Joseph Warren (1883-1946)

National Archives.  Cropped by author.

Joseph Stilwell graduated from West Point in 1904, where he first showed an unusual proficiency for mastering foreign languages, and served in the Philippines.  During the First World War, he served as an instructor at West Point and in staff positions in France, never able to realize his desire to lead men in combat. Between the wars, he served in China, becoming fluent in the language and closely observing the opening stages of the war with Japan.  At the time of Pearl Harbor, he was commanding III Corps at Fort Ord, California, having distinguished himself in the Louisiana Maneuvers.

In spite of his age, poor eyesight, and stomach problems (he would eventually die of stomach cancer,) Marshall had slated Stilwell to command Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa. Much to Stilwell’s frustration, this went down the tubes on 21 January 1942, when Roosevelt ordered him sent to China to serve as Chiang’s chief of staff.  At the time, Roosevelt considered China to be of decisive importance to the Pacific War, and Stilwell was the only high-ranking, capable officer who spoke fluent Chinese. Stilwell established his headquarters in Chungking on 4 March 1942.

This was not one of Roosevelt’s better appointments. Though he professed to respect the common Chinese soldier, Stilwell had a deep contempt for most Chinese leaders and institutions, likely dating from his previous service in China. He wrote a scathing diary, discovered after his death, in which he derisively referred to Chiang as “Peanut,” originally Chiang’s code name in Allied communications.

The trouble in China is simple. We are allied to an ignorant, illiterate, superstitious, peasant son of a bitch.

Stilwell finally found his opportunity to lead men in combat in Burma. However, he quickly discovered that the Chinese officers nominally under his command maintained radio communications directly to Chiang and that Chiang regularly countermanded Stilwell’s orders. Stilwell eventually led an epic retreat to India with about 100 members of his command, while the bulk of the surviving Chinese retreated back into Yunnan Province of China. Fenby has criticized Stilwell's walk out of Burma as a stunt that left the Chinese armies leaderless as the Japanese drove on Yunnan, but it is unclear that Stilwell's presence could possibly have made any difference.

Stilwell also came into conflict with Chennault, who made extravagant and (as it turned out) unsupportable claims for the potential of air power in China. Chennault managed to get first priority on all supplies to China, which usually left nothing with which to train and equip the Chinese troops responsible for defending the airfields.  Stilwell eventually resorted to flying Chinese recruits to India where they received American equipment and training. The divisions raised in this manner proved capable in combat, but they were much too few in number.

Stilwell led American and Chinese troops to victory at Myitkyina, opening the way for the Ledo Road to China, but the victory came at a terrific cost to the American troops involved. Stilwell apparently did not believe he could afford to relieve his exhausted Americans while Chinese troops were still fighting, because of the likely political repercussions. This may also explain his stinginess with decorations for these troops.

The Chinese troops serving under Stilwell were impressed by a general who led from the front and thought very highly of him, calling him hsien sheng ("the old gentleman"). Stilwell's peers were less impressed, calling him "the best three-star company commander in the U.S. Army." He was one theater commander who could plausibly be accused of spending too much time with the troops and too little time at his headquarters.

Stilwell refused to leave the front in Burma when the Japanese launched their massive Icho-go campaign into southern China. There is evidence that Stilwell deliberately left Chiang in the lurch, either to prove the need for extensive reforms within the Chinese Army or to bring about Chiang's fall and replacement with someone more pliant. Meanwhile, Stilwell suffered increasingly bad relations with Chiang.  This earned him the nickname “Vinegar Joe”, but it has been observed that Chiang was so difficult that if St. Francis of Assisi had been sent to China, he would have become known to history as “Vinegar Frank.”  When Chiang finally forced Roosevelt to recall Stilwell in favor of Wedemeyer, the communiqués from Wedemeyer soon began to resemble those that had been sent by Stilwell.

Stilwell served briefly as chief of Army Ground Forces, but was posted to Okinawa to command 10 Army in the projected invasion of Japan.  This never took place, and Stilwell died shortly after the war ended.

Slim liked Stilwell but offered this balanced assessment (Hastings 2007):

He was much more than the bad-tempered, prejudiced, often not very well-informed and quarrelsome old man [his diaries] showed him to be. He was all that, but in addition he was a first-class battle leader up to, I should say, Corps level, and an excellent tactician, but a poor administrator. At higher levels he had neither the temperament nor the strategic background or judgment to be effective.

Service record

References

Boatner (1996)

Costello (1981)

Fenby (2003)

Generals.dk (accessed 2007-11-26)

Hastings (2007)

Tuchman  (1972)

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia (c) 2007-2008 by Kent G. Budge.  Index