Spruance, Raymond Ames (1886-1969)

National Archives #80-G-225341

In 1924, as Bill Halsey was preparing to turn over command of destroyer Osborne to Ray Spruance, he advised the bridge crew that they should not let Spruance's quiet manner deceive them into thinking they were getting anything but an outstandingly competent commander. The crew soon learned that Spruance liked a quiet bridge, without extraneous chit-chat or the use of first names, and with orders given concisely and clearly. Tuohy (2007) recounts a telling incident:

Once in the harbor of Bizerte in French Tunisia, Osborne was anchored in 6 fathoms, or 36 feet, of water. A distraught torpedo officer rushed to the bridge and reported, "Captain, we've just dropped a depth charge over the stern!"

"Well, pick it up and put it back," was Spruance's measured response.

The brainy officer later served three tours at the prestigious Naval War College, one as a student and two as an instructor. As a student, he wrote admiringly of Japanese Admiral Togo, victor of the Battle of Tsushima, who kept his patience and cool head in battle and whose command style was to give his subordinates considerable freedom of action and let them exercise their initiative. These were the qualities that would characterize Spruance himself as a flag officer.

Things move so fast in naval actions, and the consequences that hang on the results of these actions are often so momentous, that fast teamwork is essential. Teamwork is something that comes best from associations, training and indoctrination. There are too many variables possible in war for everything to be foreseen and planned for ahead of time. Our plans can be made out in great detail up to the time we hit the enemy. After that, they have to be flexible, ready to counter what the enemy may try to do to us, and ready to take advantage of the breaks that may come to us. To do that, the man on the spot must know where he fits into the operation, and he must be able to act on his own initiative either without any orders at all, because radio silence may be in effect, or on very brief orders because there is not time for long instructions.

(Tuohy 2007)

After war broke out in Europe, Spruance was named commandant of 10 Naval District, covering the Caribbean Sea. The destroyers for bases agreement in September 1940 focused attention on 10 Naval District, and Spruance received frequent visits from the upper brass. This included Ernest King, future commander of the U.S. Fleet, and the two officers developed a mutual respect. When the Marines held landing exercises at Culebra, Puerto Rico, King invited Spruance to observed the exercises from King's flagship, where Spruance became acquainted with "Howling Mad" Smith, the Marine amphibious landing expert. Spruance concluded that Smith was a man who knew his business.

By the time war broke out in the Pacific, Spruance was a rear admiral and commander of the cruiser screen for Halsey's carriers. When Halsey fell ill before the crucial Midway campaign, Nimitz asked him to name his own replacement. Halsey named Spruance. Nimitz had already decided to appoint Spruance as his chief-of-staff, but delayed the assignment until after the victory at Midway.

Though Spruance was junior to Fletcher, who therefore commanded the American carrier forces, Spruance took the initiative to launch a full deck load strike at maximum range in order to catch the Japanese refueling and rearming their aircraft. The results were devastating. Spruance's and Fletcher's strikes chanced to arrive over the Japanese force at about the same time, and in just fifteen minutes the Dauntlesses knocked out three of the four large Japanese carriers in Nagumo's force. After Fletcher's flagship, Yorktown, was badly damaged by a counter strike of Japanese dive bombers, Fletcher turned tactical command of the American force over to Spruance. Spruance thus made most of the critical decisions during the battle, including the controversial decision to sail east that night. Spruance was criticized for letting so much of the Japanese Navy escape, but destruction of the Japanese fleet was never an expectation for this battle, and postwar analysis confirms that Spruance would have run directly into Yamamoto's powerful surface force, which was superbly trained for night actions, had he chosen to pursue the enemy.

Following the battle of Midway, one of Spruance's staff read aloud a radio news report of a particularly gruesome murder in the United States. Another staff officer wondered how anyone but a madman could be capable of such a thing. Spruance quietly replied, "What do you think I have been doing all morning?" Spruance would later speak against the fire bombing of Japanese cities.

It is ironic that Halsey should recommend Spruance to an important command, for the two men were polar opposites. Unlike Halsey, who was an aggressive, flamboyant, and vulgar aviator, much beloved of his sailors, Spruance was an admiral's admiral – cool, intellectual, and calculating, with no aviation experience and no love for publicity. He was a nonsmoker and could often be found exercising on the deck of his flagship, and he insisted on an undisturbed night's sleep when not actually conducting combat operations.

I believe that making war is a game that requires cold and careful calculation. It might be a very serious thing if we turned the wrong way, just once.

It seems clear that Nimitz intended Spruance to be the second admiral in the Pacific and commander of the fighting fleet. However, Spruance could never get out from under Halsey's shadow. In the last two years of the war, the two men took turns commanding the main combat elements of the Pacific Fleet. These were known as 3 Fleet when Halsey was in command and 5 Fleet when Spruance commanded. Captain George Dyer said of the two leaders (Tuohy 2007):

My feeling was one of confidence when Spruance was there. When you moved into Admiral Spruance's command from Admiral Halsey's ... you moved from an area in which you never knew what you were going to do in the next five minutes or how you were going to do it, because the printed instructions were never up to date.... He never did things the same way twice. When you moved into Admiral Spruance's command, the printed instructions were up to date, and you did things in accordance with them.

Notwithstanding their different personalities, Spruance and Halsey were close friends, which helped make this unusual command arrangement work. In fact, Spruance had a knack for getting along with difficult people, including his friend Kelly Turner, the hotheaded commander of 5 Fleet's amphibious force. One exception was John Towers, a constant critic of Spruance, who Spruance came to despise for his naked ambition. Spruance also took some time to warm to his fast carrier commander, Marc Mitscher, who he believed (with some cause) had performed poorly at Midway. However, Spruance gave Mitscher considerable freedom to command the carrier force his own way, and the two men eventually developed a great respect for each other.

Spruance was strongly criticized by aviators for failing to aggressively pursue the Japanese fleet at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Spruance understood his primary mission to be supporting the amphibious invasion of Saipan, and he took no chance of a Japanese force slipping in behind him. His fear was not irrational. Prados (1995) reports that Spruance had an intelligence digest, based on documents captured from Combined Fleet chief of staff Fukudome, indicating Japanese plans for such an end run. King supported Spruance, telling him that "Spruance, you did a damn fine job there. No matter what other people tell you, your decision was correct" (Tuohy 2007). Mitscher told his chief of staff, Arleigh Burke, that (ibid.):

You and I have been in many battles, and we know there are always some mistakes. This time we were right because the enemy did what we expected him to do. Admiral Spruance could have been right. He's one of the finest officers I know of. It was his job to protect the landing force....

Ironically, Halsey would later take criticism for aggressively pursuing a Japanese carrier force and leaving the Leyte invasion forces vulnerable to Kurita's surface force, which slipped in behind him. Halsey later commented that it might have been better if he had been in command during the Philippines Sea battle and Spruance in command at Leyte. However, both battles were decisive American victories.

Unlike Halsey, Spruance never received his fifth star. Congress had only authorized the Navy to recommend a limited number of officers to become fleet admirals, and it came down to a choice between Halsey and Spruance. Halsey, the hero of the popular press, was the perhaps inevitable choice. However, Spruance was voted retirement pay for life at the full rate for a four-star admiral.

After the war, Spruance served as president of the Naval War College, a post this enthusiastic autodidact had long coveted. He served as ambassador to the Philippines and probably had a hand in covert U.S. efforts to help Magsaysay become president of the Philippines. The death of his son in 1969 seems to have put Spruance into a depression that lasted until his death from stroke later that year. He was buried at Golden Gate National Cemetery alongside his close companions in the Pacific War, Nimitz, Turner, and Lockwood.

Service record

References

Buell (1987)

DANFS (accessed 2008-1-12)
Pettibone (2006)
Tillman (2005)
Tuohy (2007)

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