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Leyte is a large island in the
eastern Philippines,
115 miles (185 km) long and 45 miles (72 km) wide and with a total area
of 2,785 square miles (7213 square kilometers). It was discovered by
Magellan in March 1521. Legaspi, founder
of Manila, visited frequently
during the 1560s and most of the inhabitants were converted
to
Catholicism.
The population burgeoned under American
rule and was about 915,000 by 1939.
Leyte Valley, in the northeast of the island,
was a rice and corn belt. The
regional capital, Tacloban, is
located here. The beaches off Tacloban were highly suitable for landing operations, with
tides of just two or three feet, but
the ground inland proved too boggy
for rapid airfield development.
It did not help the American invasion in October 1944 that the monsoon reached its peak in the
autumn months. Coastal roads and a single road through the
mountains south of Leyte Valley
connected Tacloban with Ormoc,
located on
the north of Ormoc Bay on the west side of the island.
Leyte was selected as the initial target for the American reconquest of the Philippines, bypassing Mindanao. The Japanese fleet sortied in response to the invasion, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
MacArthur's original
plan for retaking the Philippines was to invade Mindanao at Sarangani Bay on 25 October
1944 to secure airfields from
which to cover the invasion of Leyte on
15 November. However, Halsey
encountered so
little air opposition during his strikes in the area in mid-September
1944 that he proposed Mindanao be bypassed and Leyte seized with naval
air cover alone. This suggestion was adopted at the OCTAGON conference on 15 September 1944,
and the invasion date for Leyte was set for 20 October 1944. This
required that Wilkinson's
amphibious force, carrying XXIV Corps, be
diverted to Leyte rather than assaulting Yap,
and
there was not even time to reload the cargo or switch landing craft to types more
suitable for Leyte.
Command arrangements for the
campaign were muddled, as the Philippines lay close to the theater
boundaries for the Southwest
Pacific
Area, Pacific
Ocean
Areas, and China-Burma-India.
Although
MacArthur commanded Krueger's
6
Army and Kinkaid's 7 Fleet, the
operation was so large that it required the loan of Wilkinson's force
from Pacific
Fleet, which was commanded by Nimitz. Distant cover was
provided by the fast carriers
of 3 Fleet, also
under Pacific Fleet, and air support was divided between
China-Burma-India, Southwest Pacific, and Pacific Ocean Areas. Thus
important elements of the operation were commanded by separate theater
commanders directly responsible to the Joint
Chiefs
of Staff. This confused and divided command arrangement
would have important consequences during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In particular, Halsey
was under orders to make the destruction of the Japanese Fleet, not the
protection of the amphibious forces, his highest priority.
Preliminaries. On 9 October
1944, the Allies attempted to deceive
the Japanese on their next
move by raiding Marcus Island,
to
suggest a climb up the Bonins
ladder. This was followed by a raid by the British on the Nicobar Islands to suggest a
move against Malaya
or the Netherlands
East Indies. Neither deception effort had the least effect
on the Japanese, to whom it was obvious that the Philippines were the
next target.
From 10 to 14 October 1944, Halsey conducted a series of strikes
against Okinawa and Formosa to interdict Japanese air
reinforcements to the Philippines. The strikes against Okinawa
destroyed perhaps 111 Japanese aircraft at the cost of 21 American
aircraft and nine aircrew. In addition, four Japanese cargo ships, twelve torpedo boats, and several
other auxiliaries were sunk. The strikes against Formosa begining the
next day caught Japanese Combined Fleet commander Toyoda on Formosa, and his chief
of staff, Kusaka,
immediately ordered preliminary preparations to execute Sho. He also ordered the air groups
from the remaining Japanese carriers to deploy to Formosa. As a result,
these air groups were savaged and their carriers rendered toothless for
the upcoming naval battle.
Halsey's strikes destroyed between 550 and 600 Japanese aircraft and
sank about 40 merchant ships at the cost of 78 Allied aircraft. The
large aircraft maintenance facility at Okayama
was heavily bombed by Superfortresses
of 20 Air
Force, while medium and
heavy bombers from 14 Air Force
struck Hong Kong. However, the
Japanese managed to slip eight torpedo
bombers past the American fleet defenses at sunset on 13 October
1944 and badly damage heavy
cruiser Canberra, flooding both engine
rooms. Rather than scuttle the ship, Halsey decided to tow the cripple
to safety while conducting an additional unscheduled strike against
Formosa. That night, another Japanese dusk raid put a torpedo into light cruiser Houston,
flooding
all engineering spaces. Again, Halsey chose to tow the cripple
to safety rather than scuttle. The two ships were joined by escorts and
organized into "CripDiv1" for their long tow to Ulithi. The Japanese sent several
strikes against the cripples, inflicting very light damage from a bomb hit on carrier Franklin
and scoring another torpedo hit
on Houston. This nearly
finished the cruiser, but excellent damage control saved the ship.
At this point, based on Japanese radio broadcasts claiming a great
naval victory off Formosa, Halsey decided to use the cripples as bait
to ambush any sortie by the main
strength of the Japanese Navy. Thus they became "BaitDiv1", a play on
BatDiv1. However, the Japanese sent out only a small force of cruisers
and destroyers to "mop up" the "shattered" U.S. Fleet, and its
commander, Shima, sensed a
trap and withdrew before his force could be ambushed.
Filipino guerrillas were
active on the island of Leyte, and
had been in touch with MacArthur's
headquarters since 1942. Charles Parsons, a Navy reservist who had
gotten out of the Philippines under diplomatic
cover, had made a number of visits by submarine to the guerrillas and
made a final trip by PBY on
10 October to warn the guerrillas of the impending invasion. The
guerrillas were able to warn local residents and, as a result, it was
later claimed that not a single Filipino civilian was killed in the preinvasion
bombardment.
The Landings. The first landings took place on the
morning of 17 October 1944 on the Dinagat Islands around the mouth of Leyte Gulf. These were carried out by Army Rangers to destroy radar installations on the islands and
prepare the way for the main landings. At the same time, minesweepers began sweeping the
approaches to Leyte.
The main landings on Leyte commenced at 10000 on 20 October 1944. A daylight approach was chosen to ensure that the amphibious groups could safely navigate the swept channel. The troops were from 1 Cavalry Division and 24 Division of Sibert's X Corps and 7 and 96 Divisions from Hodge's XXIV Corps, with overall command resting with Krueger's 6 Army. The landing craft suffered some casualties from mortar fire, but otherwise there was little opposition on the beaches, as the defending 16 Division quickly retreated to prepared positions inland. The Americans were able to seize Tacloban airfield that afternoon. However, this turned out to be a miserable, muddy strip of limited military usefulness.
The Japanese Navy activated the Sho
operation as
soon as the landings on the Dinagat Islands began. The resulting Battle
of Leyte Gulf
(23-25 October 1944) was the largest naval battle in history and ended
in a decisive American victory.
The Japanese plan called for a rearguard action on hills overlooking
the beaches, with the main resistance along the mountainous spine of
the island. This was originally planned as a delaying action involving
only 16 Division, with the
decisive battle for the Philippines to be fought on Luzon. However, Yamashita would not be permitted to fight the battle for the Philippines the way he wished.
Securing the Island. The
American advance was soon reduced a crawl in the
mountainous spine of Leyte, and the battle became protracted as
Japanese reinforcements
were brought in to Ormoc, on the
west coast of the island, in destroyer
runs
reminiscent of the Guadalcanal
campaign. Yamashita
would have preferred to abandon Leyte and concentrate his forces on
Luzon, but his superior, Field Marshal Terauchi, insisted that
Leyte be defended to the last. By 1 November 30
and 102 Divisions
had joined 16 Division
on Leyte. These three divisions
came under the command of 35 Army (Suzuki). Eventually 1, 8, and 28 Divisions would also be
committed to the struggle. The Americans in turn brought in 11 Airborne Division (Swing) on 18 November, whose 511 Parachute Regiment was soon spearheading the attack across the mountainous spine of Leyte, fighting as elite infantry.
A force of 300 Japanese paratroops (Katori Shimpei)
raided the Allied-controlled airfields in northeast Leyte on the
evening of 6 December 1944. The
Japanese succeeded in destroying a number of aircraft, but were driven
from the airfields the next morning by a scratch force built around 127
Parachute Engineer Battalion and 674 Parachute Artillery Battalion from
11 Airborne Division, whose headquarters was located just east of San
Pablo airstrip. The next day, these were joined by 187 Glider Regiment
to complete the mopping up of the remaining Japanese. Search
of the dead Japanese discovered English phrase books with phrases
ranging from "Go to hell, beast" to the memorably clumsy "I am chief
commander on Japanese descent paratrooper army. All the airdrome of ___
has been taken tonight by the Japanese Army. It is resistless, so you
must surrender. Answer yes or no. All the Japanese Army has done great
attack" (Devlin 1979).
Faced with a stalemate ashore, the Americans tried an amphibious
end-run on 7 December, landing 77 Division
just south of Ormoc. The
Japanese were caught off-balance and Ormoc was taken on 10 December.
Elements of the division made a second successful end-run on 25
December. By this time, Yamashita had informed Suzuki that he was on
his own and no transports were available to evacuate his forces.
The island was finally secured on 31 December 1944. Japanese casualties were 65,000 dead and about 5,000 taken prisoner. The Americans had 15,000 dead and wounded. The conduct of the battle pointed to serious weaknesses in 6 Army, from its highest commanders to the riflemen at the front. All too often, American units took cover at the first sign of enemy fire and reported themselves pinned down. However, by choosing to fight on Leyte, Terauchi had seriously weakened the defense of Luzon.
Postwar, during the trial of Yamashita for war crimes
committed in the Philippines, the prosecution presented evidence that
some 300 Filipinos were massacred on Ponson Island, in the mouth of
Ormoc Bay, during the Leyte campaign.
References
Milwaukee Sentinel (1945-11-12; accessed 2012-12-27)
Morison
(1958)
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