Luzon

Luzon is the northernmost and largest of the Philippine Islands, extending about 340 miles (550 km) from north to south with an area of 40,814 square miles (105,707 km²). It is characterized by three north-south mountain ranges separated by broad alluvial plains. The Sierra Madre along the upper east coast reaches to 6188' (1886 meters) and is separated from the Cordillera Mountains to the west by the Cagayan river valley, which is the second most important agricultural area in the Philippines. The Cordilleras reach to 9613' (2930 meters) and are separated from the Caraballo Mountains to the southwest by the central Luzon plain, which is the most productive agricultural area in the Philippines. The Caraballo Mountains reach to 6686' (2038 meters) and their southern extension forms the Bataan Peninsula. To the southeast of the main body of the island is the Legaspi Peninsula, which was largely undeveloped jungle in 1941.

Luzon was the most populous and developed of the Philippine Islands in 1941, with a population of 7,384,798 persons. There was a good road network and over 700 miles (1100 km) of railroads, and most towns were connected by telephone and telegraph. The island includes the superb harbor of Manila Bay, which was protected in 1941 by the Corregidor island fortress complex and several airfields, including Clark Field. The island produces sugar (about 1.3 million tons a year in 1941) and rice, with the most productive regions being the central plain north of Manila Bay and the Cagayen Valley in the northeastern part of the island. Chromium and manganese are mined in the Zambales Mountains along the west coast.

The first Luzon campaign

The Japanese opened the first Luzon campaign with landings at Legaspi on 12 December 1941. This completed the blockade of Luzon and paved the way for the main landings at Lingayen Gulf on the northwest coast of the island on 22 December and secondary landings at Lamon Bay on the east coast near Manila on 24 December. The forces landed at Lingayen Gulf (all from 14 Army) included the bulk of 48 Division; 20 Regiment, 16 Division; and 4 Tank Regiment, while the landings at Lamon Bay were carried out by the remaining elements of 16 Division (7000 men.) 

Both landings were only weakly opposed. 71 Regiment had been ordered to block the movement of 2 Formosa Regiment south from Vigan and Aparri, but was nearly trapped by the Lingayen Gulf landings, escaped to Baguio, and ended moving east and out of the battle.

The Japanese plan was for 48 Division to raced south, leaving only 9 Regiment to mop up and secure its communications, while the elements of 16 Division at Lamon Bay were to advance south to Taybas Bay to cut Luzon in half, then advance on Manila. Once the main battle was won, 48 Division would be redeployed against the Netherland East Indies while 65 Brigade completed mopping up and 16 Division reduced the Visayas and Mindanao.

Faced with a pincers movement, MacArthur decided to retreat to Bataan. In order to buy enough time to get South Luzon Force through Manila before the pincers closed, MacArthur ordered North Luzon Force to hold five successive lines across the central Luzon plain. The plan worked successfully and over 100,000 men were moved into Bataan before Homma, whose attention had been fixed on Manila, realized what was afoot. The last American and Filipino forces withdrew into the peninsula on 5 January 1942.

By 9 January Homma had redeployed his troops to attack the American positions. Although the American line on the western side of the peninsula held, the eastern line was penetrated, and by 24 January the Americans were forced back to their second defense line. This was assaulted in strength on 3 April, after careful preparation, and the American lines were quickly pierced. General King, the commander of Allied forces on Bataan, was forced to surrender on 9 April 1942. 75,000 sick and starving prisoners of war were marched to camps in central Luzon, 100 miles away, in what became known as the Bataan Death March. Thousands of prisoners died of mistreatment along the way, making this the single greatest atrocity committed against American troops during the war.

Japanese order of battle, 12 December 1941

Allied order of battle, 12 December 1941

The second Luzon campaign

MacArthur had pledged to return to the Philippines, and in mid-1944 he succeeded in persuading Roosevelt to support landings on Luzon rather than on the Navy's preferred alternative of Formosa. The decision was formalized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 October 1944. The Luzon campaign would become the second largest American campaign of the Second World War, exceeded only by the campaign in northwest Europe.

MacArthur, like the Japanese in the first Luzon campaign, chose to land his main force at Lingayen Gulf. This required that the invasion convoy sail 200 miles (300 km) from the assembly area in Leyte Gulf to the landing beaches in the face of determined kamikaze attacks.

Preliminary Strikes. The Allied invasion force for Luzon began assembling on 2 January 1945. The invasion force was massive, with Oldendorf's covering force alone consisting of 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 14 destroyers, 6 destroyer escorts, 12 escort carriers, and other supporting and screening ships. As the invasion force prepared to sortie, Halsey's 3 Fleet attempted to eliminate the kamikaze threat with a series of airfield strikes, beginning with strikes against Formosa and the Ryukyus on 3-4 January in an effort to cut the air bridge from Japan. These strikes encountered poor weather, losing 22 aircraft without being able to observe the results of their strikes. However, no Japanese aircraft from Formosa participated in attacks on the invasion convoy. Halsey refueled on 5 January, then struck Luzon on 6 January, destroying perhaps 32 aircraft. The weather finally improved on 7 January and Halsey's pilots had their best day, claiming four aircraft shot down and 75 destroyed on the ground, at a cost of 28 aircraft (of which 18 were operational losses.)  Japanese air opposition was sporadic thereafter. Halsey refueled again on 8 January and made a final strike against Formosa on 9 January before executing a raid into the South China Sea. The 9 January strikes were again hindered by poor weather, and those planes that got through discovered that most of the aircraft at Heito airfield were dummy aircraft. However, Halsey's raiders were joined by B-29s from Kunming, which attacked shipping in and around Formosa. Total American aircraft losses in the series of raids numbered 86, of which 40 were operational losses.

Approach to Lingayen Gulf. The Japanese had detected the invasions preparations almost at once, and Halsey's strikes failed to completely eliminate the kamikaze threat. The Japanese expended some 240 aircraft in attacks on the American invasion force between 2-7 January 1945. These began with a near-miss on oiler Cowanesque shortly after the minesweepers leading the invasion force sortied on 2 January. Sporadic attacks continued through 4 January but were greatly hindered by the Allied combat air patrol. However, at 1712 on 4 January, a single two-engined kamikaze approached undetected and dove on Ommaney Bay, striking her flight deck amidshps. The aircraft's two bombs exploded in the hangar deck and in the forward engine room, the fires raged out of control, and Ommaney Bay was abandoned and scuttled. The kamikaze had approached from behind the mountains of Panay that blocked radar and was not spotted until seconds before impact.

5 January 1945 marked the first really intense kamikaze battle of the passage. The Japanese spotted Oldendorf's covering force early in the morning, and air cover from Mindoro was impossible due to weather, leaving the convoy to be protected only by its own escort carriers. Raids at 0458 and 1125 were repulsed by the combat air patrol, and Momi was spotted and sunk as she tried to flee Manila for Formosa. However, at 1650 a raid by 16 kamikazes and four escorting fighters managed to damage two heavy cruisers, an escort carrier and a destroyer escort.

6 January was the worst day of the passage. Oldendorf's force began to deploy, which increased the difficulties of fighter direction and decreased the concentration of antiaircraft. The first raids hit as Oldendorf began his preliminary bombardment, but inflicted no damage until noon, when New Mexico was hit on the bridge by a kamikaze that killed 30 men and wounded 87 others. The casualties included the battleship's commander, Churchill's personal liaison officer, and a Time Magazine correspondent. At about the same time, destroyer Walke was hit by a kamikaze that left her commander burning "like a living torch" (Morison 1959). The commander, George F. Davis, was extinguished and continued conning the ship until the raid was over, but died several hours later. Later that afternoon, a minesweeper was sunk and battleship California, three cruisers, two destroyers, a destroyer-transport, and a minesweeper were damaged. The fighter defense was overwhelmed, radar often being hindered by nearby mountains and the FM-2 Wildcats proving distinctly inferior to the newer Japanse Zero fighter models. The most destructive raids were carried out by just 28 kamikazes and 15 escorts, but the Japanese had already expended the cream of their kamikaze corps.

That evening, Hovey was sunk by a conventional aerial torpedo attack, and the next evening Palmer was sunk by a conventional bombing attack. There were no more successful kamikaze attacks until 8 January, when Australia, already damaged on 6 January, was repeatedly hit but refused to retire for repairs.

The transport convoy was spared the worse of the kamikazes, which concentrated on the covering force. Boise barely evaded a pair of torpedoes from a midget submarine on 5 January. Sporadic kamikaze raids hit an LST and barely missed several other ships, but the convoy escorts sank Hinoki on the evening of 7 January as she attempted to escape from Manila Bay. The worst kamikaze raids, on the morning of 8 January, damaged an escort carrier and an attack transport, but not a single soldier of the invasion force was injured. The final blow of the kamikazes came on 9 January with a damaging hit on escort carrier Kitkun Bay.

The passage of the invasion force to Lingayen Gulf showed the kamikazes at the peak of their effectiveness. A relatively modest number of aircraft inflicted the most serious casualties on Allied navies since the battle of Tassafaronga. However, the kamikazes did not halt the invasion, and the casualties were actually less than the most pessimistic Allied projections.

Landings. The landings themselves began at 0900 on 9 January, spearheaded by elements of 6 and 43 Divisions of Swift's I Corps on the left at San Fabian and and 37 and 40 Division from Griswold's XIV Corps on the right at Lingayen. The beaches were relatively exposed and subject to heavy surf, and the terrain behind them was less than idea, with numerous ponds, swamps, and rivers that favored the defenders. However, for these reasons, it was anticipated that Japanese defenses would be less formidable, and the 5000' (1500 meter) airstrip at Lingayen and Port Sual on the extreme right were valuable prizes if they could be seized quickly. LCI gunboats pounded the beaches, then the first wave went ashore, consisting of LVT(A) amphibious tanks. They was followed by several waves of LVT infantry carriers, which in turn were followed by waves of LCVPs, LCMs, and LSMs. Artillery was brought in by DUKWs as needed. 37 Division alone was provided with 13 LVT(A)s, 84 LVTs, 165 LCVPs, 12 LCMs and four LSMs in thirteen waves, plus two battalions of artillery carried by 13 DUKWs.

During the landings, Columbia, already damaged by earlier kamikaze attacks, was hit again but remained in action. Mississippi was also hit and suffered heavy casualties. Destroyer Jenkins was hit by a 75mm shell from a coastal battery but returned fire and put the battery out of action. Six landing ships were also hit by the coastal guns but suffered only moderate damage.

Opposition was very light on the beaches themselves, particularly in front of XIV Corps, which suffered just 30 killed in the first week of the operation. I Corps was less fortunate, suffering 220 killed and 660 wounded in the first week, but this was still much lighter than anticipated. The most serious opposition was on the extreme left flank. Pontoon causeways were quickly constructed to speed unloading, and about 30,000 tons of supplies were ashore by the end of the first day, and the beachhead was already 8000 yards (7300 meters) deep at its deepest penetration, in front of 43 Division.

That night the Allies attempted to protect their landing force with a smoke screen generated by specially equipped landing craft. This proved effective against kamikaze aircraft, but was no use against a force of 70 motor boats from Port Sual. These were not suicide boats, though their tactics were desperate: The lightly armed craft attempted to race alongside Allied vessels and drop depth charges near their hulls, then attempt to get away before the charges exploded. Two LCIs were lost and seven other ships ships damaged, but the motor boat force suffered heavy casualties and made no further attacks during the campaign.

An armored group and 25 Division landed two days later. By then the airstrip at Lingayen was ready for emergency landings, and Army fighters arrived to provide local air cover. However, by the time the last kamikaze attack in the Philippines took place, on 13 January, another escort carrier, two destroyer escorts, and two destroyer-transports had been hit, and Colorado had suffered heavy casualties from an errant antiaircraft shell.

The Dash to Manila. Yamashita, the Japanese commander, decided not to contest the landings. Instead, he ordered most of his forces (numbering some 260,000 men) move into mountainous areas of Luzon where they were to hold out as long as possible. Shobu Group, under Yamashita's personal command, would retreat into the mountains surrounding the Cagayan River valley east and northeast of Lingayen Gulf, while  Kembu Group would attempt to hold Clark Field for as long as possible before retreating into the Zambales Mountains of western Luzon. Shimbu Group would hold the mountains directly east of Manila.

MacArthur wanted Krueger to dash south and take Manila as quickly as possible. MacArthur was deeply concerned about the fate of American prisoners of war and civilian internees, who he rightly feared were in danger of being massacred by their guards. However, Krueger was reluctant to do so until reinforced, because most of I Corps was required to keep Yamashita bottled up and XIV Corps was encountering significant resistance around Clark Field. Clark Field was liberated on 25 January and 32 Division and 1 Cavalry Division arrived at Lingayen on 27 January.

To prevent the Japanese retreating into Bataan, some 30,000 men of Hall's XI Corps were landed north of Subic Bay on 29 January by Struble's Amphibian Group 9 (MIKE VII) with orders to seal off the peninsula. Naval cover was provided by Cruiser Division 12 and its escorting destroyers under R.S. Riggs. The MIKE VII landings also seized San Marcelino airstrip and threatened the rear of Kembu Group. The next day a group of four fast attack transports took a battalion of 34 Regimental Combat Team to secure Grande Island in Subic Bay.

On 31 January, the two glider regiments of 11 Airborne Division (Swing) were brought ashore at Nasugbu southwest of Manila by Fechteler's Amphibian Group 8 (MIKE VI). Opposition was initially light and the division immediately began racing for Tagaytay Ridge, which overlooks Manila from the southwest and from which a two-lane concrete road led past Cavite to the city. That night, a group of Japanese suicide boats from Balayan Bay succeeded in sinking PC-1129. The wary and exhausted American sailors off the beachhead then mistakenly sank two PT boats approaching the landing craft.

The next morning, the lead regiment of 11 Airborne Division found itself at the mouth of Aga Pass, a narrow defile between Mount Cariliao on the north and Mount Batulao on the south. The Japanese were dug in on both peaks and put up fierce resistance, prompting Swing to postpone the drop of his parachute regiment on Tagaytay Ridge until 3 February.  The night before the jump, pathfinders infiltrated through the pass to Tagaytay Ridge and reported by radio that it was unoccupied. The next morning the first of three echelons of paratroops were dropped on the ridge. The first 18 aircraft dropped their troops precisely on target, but the trailing 30 aircraft mistakenly dropped their troops six milses short of the intended drop zone. It took these troops the rest of the day to march to Tagaytay Ridge. The next day, the second echelon again dropped far short of the intended drop zone when they saw the parachutes from the previous day's misplaced drop.  The third drop was more accurate, and by 4 February 1945, 11 Airborne Division was firmly in control of Tagaytay Ridge and ready to advance on Manila.

Krueger was finally issued orders for the dash on Manila on 30 January 1945. XIV Corps was to secure Clark Field and push on to the Pampanga River within two days. I Corps was to attack towards San Jose on the left flank. XI Corps would push across the Bataan Peninsula to link up with XVI Corps. With the Japanese thus pinned down, 1 Cavalry Division and 44 Tank Battalion would punch through the Japanese lines just after  midnight on 1 February and lead a flying column headed south. Two Marine air groups, MAG-32 and MAG-24, operated out of Magaldan fifteen miles east of Lingayen and provided close air support. American units reached Santo Tomas Camp and Bilibid Prison on the outskirts of Manila on the evening of 3 February, rescuing over 7000 internees.

Yamashita did not intend to defend Manila, but 20,000 naval troops under Iwabuchi Sanji ignored Yamashita's instructions to destroy the port facilities and evacuate the city. 11 Airborne Division, coming up from the south, encountered stiff resistance at Nichols Field on 4 February and was not able to break through to the city until 12 February. The Japanese sailors fought ferociously for the Intramuros, the ancient center of the city. MacArthur refused to authorize the bombing of Japanese positions in Manila, but the Americans were compelled to use artillery to root out the Japanese.The battle did not end until 3 March 1945, and Manila was left more heavily devastated than any Allied city except Warsaw. It is estimated that 100,000 Filipinos died in the battle, most apparently deliberately murdered by the Japanese sailors.

Although 11 Airborne Division secured southern Luzon by 1 May 1945, the bulk of Yamashita's forces continue to hold out in the mountains east and northeast of Manila until the Japanese surrender. However, Corregidor was assaulted on 15 February and fell on 26 February, and the first Allied ships were able to dock at Manila on 15 March 1945. Though the Japanese had left some 350 wrecked ships in the harbor, engineers found ways to rapidly float and tow aside the wrecks, and by May the harbor was handling 90,000 deadweight tons of cargo per week. By the end of the war, 24 Liberty ships could simultaneously berth. This rendered Yamashita's surviving forces militarily irrelevant. 

Total 6 Army casualties in Luzon to 30 June 1945 numbered 8297 killed or missing and 29,557 wounded. Allied naval casualties exceeded 2000 American and Australian sailors.

Allied order of battle, 30 December 1944